Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement

SARAH KENYON LISCHER

Violent conflict causes millions of people to flee their homes every year. The resulting displacement crises not only create logistical and humanitarian nightmares, these crises also threaten international security and risk the lives of displaced people, aid workers, and peacekeepers. Despite the dangers posed by conflict-induced displacement, scholars, policy makers and international organizations usually have only a partial understanding of these crises. Conflict-induced displacement consists of two main factors: 1) The violence that caused the displacement and 2) The characteristics of the resulting displacement crisis. Many observers fail to disaggregate each factor; rather lumping all types of violence together or viewing displaced people as an undifferentiated mass. This paper demonstrates that disaggregation of both concepts-causes of conflict-induced displacement and characteristics of a crisis-is necessary to understand fully the importance of displacement in international politics. The paper develops typologies to analyze those concepts and discusses the implications for future research on conflict-induced displacement.

We speak of flows, streams, waves and trickles of migrants...the metaphors we use to talk about migration require us to think of migrants as an undifferentiated mass.

David Turton[1]

Violent conflict causes millions of people to flee their homes every year. The resulting displacement crises not only create logistical and humanitarian nightmares, these crises also threaten international security and risk the lives of displaced people, aid workers, and peacekeepers. Despite the dangers posed by conflict-induced displacement, scholars, policy-makers and international organizations usually have only a partial understanding of these crises. These experts also do a remarkably poor job of predicting patterns of displacement.

A major problem in current discussions, both scholarly and popular, is the tendency to view all displacement crises as the same. Quite often, journalists and scholars describe people displaced by conflict as an indiscriminate multitude. For example, a sampling of national headlines warn of a 'growing stream of refugees' from Sudan, a 'flood of boat people' trying to reach Australia, and a 'tide

of refugees' inundating Florida.[2] The frequent reliance on water metaphors reinforces the perception of similarity among these populations, be they Sudanese refugees in Chad, asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, or Haitian migrants sailing to Florida. In reality, people displaced by conflict often have quite different motivations for flight – based on political, geographical, social, and economic factors. These differences have important, and generally overlooked, political implications.

The term 'conflict-induced displacement' describes situations in which people leave their homes to escape political violence. For the purposes of my analysis, the term 'displacement crisis' is more accurate than 'refugee crisis'. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the term refugee applies to people who have crossed international borders due to a 'well-founded fear' of persecution.[3] That legalistic definition does not include people who flee their homes during a civil war, but have not crossed international borders. For example, the conflict in Darfur has forced around two million Sudanese from their homes. Ninety per cent of the displaced languish in camps within Sudan. In some cases, displaced people may not receive official refugee status even if they cross international borders.

Analysis of conflict-induced displacement includes two main factors: (1) the violence that caused the displacement; and (2) the characteristics of the resulting displacement crisis. Scholars and policy-makers often focus exclusively on one or the other of those factors. In addition, many observers fail to disaggregate each factor, rather lumping all types of violence together or viewing displaced people as an undifferentiated mass. Such narrow analysis obscures the causes of current crises and hinders predictions about future events.

Part of the problem is that conflict-induced displacement falls in the cracks between various scholarly and practical disciplines. International relations scholars study conflict and the types of violence, but rarely connect this theoretically with forced migration. The forced migration literature usually does not make a connection with the conflict studies literature and focuses more on the outcome of the conflict than the causes.

The situation is no better for practitioners. By the time humanitarian workers and policy-makers respond to conflict-induced displacement, the situation is usually so dire as to preclude deep analysis of the precursors. Practitioners do not have the time or resources to examine the causes of the conflict and how that might relate to the dynamics of displacement. Humanitarians consider 'hard-core' security issues as beyond their purview and fear compromising their neutrality by becoming too involved with international politics. The policy-makers in charge of conflict prevention and management often work separately from refugee experts and view displacement merely as one of many undesirable outcomes of the conflict. In fact, the common myopic responses to conflict-induced displacements jeopardize international security and hinder assistance to the affected populations.

In Sudan, for example, the United Nations (UN) has repeatedly publicized the Darfur situation as 'the world's worst humanitarian crisis'.[4] Such rhetoric is meant to spur donors, but it also masks the complex nature of the crisis. In Darfur, forced

displacement is a central strategy of the combatants. Thus, it is impossible to respond effectively to the humanitarian crisis without a clear understanding of the political and military motivations involved. In recognition of that reality, humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Atlanta-based CARE, advocate an increased peacekeeping presence in Darfur, in addition to more food and medicine.[5]

To address that analytical gap, this article examines both causes and characteristics of displacement crises. By disaggregating the concept of conflict-induced displacement, the paper highlights its complexity and importance for international politics. The following section discusses types of violence, focusing on how various categories of violence affect patterns of displacement. The next section disaggregates the characteristics of displacement crises and discusses their political implications. The conclusion offers some suggestions for future research.

VIOLENCE AS A CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT

By definition, the type of displacement analyzed here is that induced by political violence. Consider again the war in the Darfur region of Sudan. Since February 2003, government soldiers and allied militia have battled rebel forces and terrorized civilians. The United Nations estimates that the government has destroyed hundreds of villages, displacing around two million people. The camps for the displaced people have been attacked by government soldiers and also served as recruitment pools for the rebel forces. Just as displacement crises develop from politics, the response to the crises can feed back into the conflict.

In the migration literature, conflict is only one of many causes of displacement. Other causes of migration include environmental degradation, natural disasters, and economic incentives. Conflict is such a broad category, however, that it does not accurately capture the various reasons that people flee violence. The type of conflict that produced the displacement – for example, civil war, international intervention, a genocidal government, or rampaging militias – affects the security of the displaced people, the likelihood of prolonged violence, and many other political factors. The type of conflict might explain whether or not displaced people flee across international borders or remain contained within their own country. The cause of the conflict could also help predict the likelihood of eventual peaceful repatriation. For instance, refugees fleeing economic injustice will more readily agree to repatriation than genocide survivors.

The Rwandan refugee crisis of 1994 provides a clear example of the dire effects of igniting conflict analysis during displacement. After directing the genocide of up to 800,000 people in spring 1994, Rwandan Hutu militants organized a massive evacuation of Hutu civilians to neighboring Zaire and Tanzania. The militants arrived fully armed and supplied with the looted contents of the state treasury. Donor states and humanitarian organizations rallied immediately with billions of dollars of assistance. Initially, many humanitarian aid workers did not even realize that thousands of genocidal killers mingled with the refugees. Donor states steadfastly refused to address the security threats posed by the crisis until full-scale

FIGURE 1
CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS

Conflict ———————▶ Displacement crisis

international war occurred between Rwanda and Zaire in 1996. In the Rwandan crisis, the standardized humanitarian response did not protect displaced people from potential security threats and did not prevent the further spread of conflict.[6]

Within the refugee studies literature, Myron Weiner developed one of the earliest classifications of conflicts that produce refugees. His research asked how governments and institutions can 'change the conditions within countries that put people to flight across international borders'. He described four categories of conflict as: interstate wars (including anti-colonial wars), ethnic conflicts, non-ethnic conflicts and fights from authoritarian and revolutionary regimes. He then categorized refugee groups over time (snapshots from 1969, 1982, and 1992) according to the type of conflict that produced the displacement. Creating a typology of conflict-induced displacement allowed Weiner to explain refugee flows and recommend policies to reduce them.[7]

More recent work uses large-n statistical studies to establish a systematic basis for predicting displacement. Will Moore and Stephen Shellman have contributed to this literature by developing a series of potential risk factors for migration. They also attempt to uncover the determinants for internal displacement as opposed to cross-border movement. This analysis focuses on micro-level determinants of displacement such as how individuals perceive potential risks and threats.[8]

Building on the insights of these scholars, my discussion presents a broad conceptual framework for examining displacement. I widen the lens from Weiner's focus on refugees to include internal displacement resulting from conflict. I also examine the various types of violence that occur within the category of civil war (see Figures 1 and 2). The disaggregated analysis allows the researcher to examine how conflict affects displacement and also how aspects of the displacement crisis may in turn affect the conflict. This analysis is not a rigid categorization since many categories of violence can occur within the same conflict. For example, most civil

FIGURE 2
DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS

Conflict ———————▶ **Displacement crisis**

Conflict		Displacement crisis
Int'l conflict	Civil conflict	Geopolitical factors
-Border wars	-Civil war	Demographic characteristics
-3rd party intervention	-Genocide	Political legitimacy
-Invasion	-Failed state	Humanitarian status
	-Persecution	

TABLE 1

KALYVAS' TYPOLOGY OF MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR

Production of Violence	Political actor intends to govern population targeted	
	Yes	No
Unilateral	State terror/persecution	Genocide & mass deportation
Bilateral (or Multilateral)	Civil war violence	'reciprocal extermination'

Source: Reproduced from Kalyvas, 'The Logic of Violence in Civil War' (note 10), 34.

wars also have international components. Refugee flows can internationalize a previously internal conflict, causing violence to spread across borders. Also, some types of violence can change or intensify over time, for example, when ethnic cleansing escalates to genocide.

CIVIL WAR

International relations scholarship in the last decade has focused primarily on the causes and resolution of civil war.[9] But even within the category of civil war there is a huge variation in types of conflict, motivations for violence, and the resulting patterns of displacement. As Stathis Kalyvas points out, most studies of civil war do not disaggregate the types of violence that occur. Instead, the vast majority of civil war research examines the onset and duration of civil wars or [their] termination and consequences.[10]

Kalyvas addresses that research problem by creating a typology of mass political violence that distinguishes violence along two axes: whether the political actor intends to govern the target population and whether the violence is one-sided or not (see Figure 3). For example, in genocidal violence, the government does not intend to govern the targets, merely to exterminate them. That type of civil war violence is markedly different from a situation in which two groups are vying for control over the state and each other.

Although Kalyvas does not directly address conflict-induced displacement, one can apply his typology to that issue. For example, some types of civil war violence include displacement as a goal whereas, in other wars, displacement is an incidental outcome of the conflict. In instances of unilateral state violence, such as ethnic cleansing or deportation, the goal of the conflict is to displace civilians, usually across state borders. Rebel groups may also use displacement as a tactic of war. Violence that targets civilians for strategic purposes, and the resulting displacement, presents greater obstacles to resolution. Peaceful repatriation is unlikely to occur in the absence of political or military change in the home state.

In Burundi during the 1990s, both government and rebel forces displaced civilians to further their war aims. The government herded Hutu villagers into overcrowded and unsanitary regroupment camps to deprive the rebels of a potential source of support. The Hutu rebels, conversely, sought to create a vast population of

Hutu refugees to undermine the legitimacy of the Tutsi government and provide cover for rebel activity.

Another type of internal conflict occurs when non-state actors are the primary perpetrators of violence. Sometimes militias, bandits or gangs operate independently of a weak government. Alternatively, non-state violence can displace civilians when the militias or gangs function in cahoots with the government.

In a collapsed state, such as Somalia during most of the 1990s, no government exists to stem violence. Conflict-induced displacement occurs as people flee chaos, threats of random violence, and economic devastation. Regional militias, warlords, criminal gangs, and bandits perpetrate violence motivated by political and economic goals. The people displaced by this type of conflict may find themselves in a sort of limbo if no state exists to negotiate their status or guarantee their safety upon return. Restrictive interpretations of refugee law may leave these people without any legal protection or formal refugee status since they cannot claim to fear state persecution.

Non-state actors also cause displacement in states with functioning central governments. The state may use militias or other irregular groups as a way to avoid direct responsibility for violence against civilians. The most recent high-profile example of this is the Sudanese Janjaweed militias in the Darfur region. Millions of people have been displaced from their homes, including over 200,000 who have trekked across the border into Chad. Human rights groups have exposed the ties between the militias and the Sudanese government, which the government hoped to obscure.

Similar dynamics occurred during the war in Bosnia when Serb militias conducted vicious ethnic cleansing campaigns against Muslims. The Yugoslav government tried to describe this militia action as the work of as rogue elements, although investigation revealed that the militias and gangs acted at the behest of state leaders. John Mueller argues that 'the violence that erupted in Yugoslavia principally derived not from a frenzy of nationalism…but rather from the actions of recently empowered and unpoliced thugs'.[11] Basically, in these and other cases, the non-state actors help governments achieve their goals, which often include massive and violent displacement.

International Conflict

In recent decades, most conflict-induced displacement has been caused by civil war, as opposed to international war. The international refugee regime was founded, however, to address the massive displacement issues that resulted from World War II. Historical experience and the threat of overwhelming refugee flows encourages governments and international organizations to consider the potential displacement effects of international conflict. For the purposes of understanding displacement, this analysis disaggregates international conflict into three main types: invasion, border wars, and multilateral intervention.

During an invasion, the goals of the invading state include seizing a large amount of territory and/or overthrowing the government of the target state. Recent examples

of international invasions include Iraq's attack on Kuwait in 1990 and the 1996 Rwandan invasion of Zaire. Rwanda's invasion was a response to cross-border attacks emanating from the Hutu refugee camps on the Rwanda/Zaire border. A major goal of Rwanda's attack was to force the refugees back across the border and disrupt the militants operating out of the refugee camps.

In addition to causing displacement, international conflict, such as the Rwandan invasion of Zaire, also results from the perceived threat of refugee flows, especially if the refugee presence threatens the stability of the host state. For example, in 1971, 10 million refugees from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) overran India's West Bengal state in a period of months. The refugee influx prompted India's invasion of East Pakistan. Ambassador Sen, the Indian representative to the UN, explained to the Security Council why India had to intervene militarily. He coined the term 'refugee aggression' to describe Pakistan's crime against India: 'If aggression against another foreign country means that it strains its social structure, that it ruins its finances, that it has to give up its territory for sheltering the refugees...what is the difference between that kind of aggression and the other type...when someone declares war?'[12]

The second type of international conflict, border wars, are generally more limited in terms of goals and intensity. Border wars often occur when rebel groups establish bases across the border. The resulting conflict may escalate from hot pursuit raids to full-scale mobilization by the neighboring military forces. Disputes about territory or demarcation also lead to border conflicts, such as occurred between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000.

A common pattern in displacement from border wars is cross-directional refugee flows. In effect, the opposing sides often trade refugee populations. Current border skirmishes between Sudan and Chad follow that pattern. The Sudanese government has accused Chad's President Idriss Deby of supporting anti-Khartoum rebels. Sudanese planes have bombed villages and refugee camps on the Chad side of the border, sending Chadian civilians fleeing across the border to Darfur.[13] Chad responded with claims that the Sudanese government is providing sanctuary for anti-Deby rebels. As refugees flee in both directions in a vain search for security, both states are further militarizing their common border.

A third type of international conflict is a multilateral intervention, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. Generally, these interventions can pursue a variety of goals, including stabilizing a weak government, redressing human rights abuses, and responding to international aggression. Predicting patterns of conflict-induced displacement during multilateral interventions has proven to be difficult. In several high-profile interventions, international predictions of refugee flows have been widely off the mark. In 1999, NATO and the UN High Commission for Refugees were caught by surprise when the impending NATO intervention in Kosovo spurred the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians to neighboring countries. This led to delays in the provision of humanitarian aid for the refugees. Observers also feared that the influx of Albanians into Macedonia would upset that country's delicate ethnic balance.

The swift resolution of the Kosovo conflict, and continued NATO protection, led to a remarkably quick return of the refugees. In less decisively settled wars, repatriation occurs much more slowly, if at all.

Prior to the United States-led interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, most international organizations predicted widespread displacement and massive refugee outflows to neighboring states. UNHCR and partner organizations prepared accordingly. In the events, relatively low levels of displacement occurred. The erroneous predictions suggest a need for a better integration of demographic data with political analysis of a crisis.

In Iraq, for example, demographic and economic statistics led to over-confident predictions of a dire displacement crisis in 2003. The most often repeated fact in the run-up to the invasion was that the majority of people depended on government food handouts. Planners hypothesized that the US intervention would disrupt that rationing system, and probably the electricity and water systems as well. This led to a conclusion that massive displacement would follow such disruptions. UN officials 'estimated in a "medium-case scenario" up to 10 million Iraqis would need immediate food aid during a war'. It also estimated that the conflict would produce up to 2 million displaced Iraqis and 500,000 to 1.5 million refugees.[14] The invasion did cause humanitarian suffering and infrastructure damage, but surprisingly little conflict-induced displacement. Instead, the military and humanitarian organizations were faced with unexpected issues such as a lack of heart medicine for city dwellers.[15] It is possible that integration of political and military analysis might have assisted in more efficient pre-war planning. During the run-up to the war, many NGOs felt excluded and alienated by the military-led relief planning effort.

The problem of prediction in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates a humanitarian dilemma. When humanitarian planners are ignorant of military strategy and timing, they find it nearly impossible to predict accurately the humanitarian needs of the war-afflicted population. But humanitarian organizations do not want to be perceived as planning their activities in coordination with the military either. To maintain strict independence and neutrality, their plans are based on incomplete information. This leaves them open to charges of waste and incompetence when the crisis does not develop as predicted. But coordinating with the military can increase the security threats against aid workers since they will be viewed as allied with the combatants.

An important caveat to understanding the types of conflict that cause displacement is that motivation for flight can encompass more than one reason. The various types of violence discussed here often blend together in any given conflict. In addition to violence, other motivations may encourage flight from a conflict zone. People not directly threatened by conflict or persecution may flee due to economic devastation, epidemics, or environmental destruction that endanger their livelihoods. In eastern Congo, for example, multiple motivations are inducing displacement, including ethnic cleansing, general banditry by non-state actors, and untenable health and living conditions.

TABLE 2

CATEGORIZING CONFLICT-RELATED DISPLACEMENT

Geopolitical	Political legitimacy	Demographic characteristics	Humanitarian status
• Across international borders (refugees and would-be refugees) or within state borders	• Formally recognized (either temporary or permanent status) or unrecognized	• In camps or self-settled	• Assisted or unassisted
	• Informal legitimacy (e.g. int'l sympathy)	• Age/gender categories	• Crisis situation or stabilized
		• Ethnicity and ethnic ties with host state	

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DISPLACEMENT CRISES

Why is it important to disaggregate the characteristics of a displacement crisis? To an international relations scholar or policy-maker, this might seem like a pointless exercise best left to humanitarian organizations and statisticians. Yet the characteristics of a crisis can indicate the possible effects on international security and stability. Some crises have a greater potential for causing conflict or for resisting a peaceful resolution than others.

There are numerous ways to categorize the people displaced by conflict. Some of the major distinctions concern geopolitical status, political legitimacy, demographic characteristics, and humanitarian status (see Figure 4). In discussing those distinctions, I do not present an exhaustive disaggregation of conflict-induced displacement. There are many additional categories by which one can differentiate people displaced by conflict. The usefulness of the categories depends on the questions being asked. For example, to a human rights activist, the distinction of whether a victim of abuse has crossed an international border is not usually the most salient characteristic of the displacement whereas government officials usually find that distinction quite important.

Geopolitical Characteristics

Conflict produces displacement within the affected state (internally displaced persons or IDPs) and across international borders (refugees or would-be refugees). Due to the state-centric nature of policy responses to displacement, this is usually the first salient category for disaggregation. The media tends to ignore the wrangling by specialists over who qualifies as a refugee. Most reports on displaced people make no distinction between internally displaced people, recognized refugees, and unrecognized refugees. Yet, quite often, the geopolitical distinctions among displaced people determine their legal classification. Geography determines whether a displaced person has a chance of qualifying for international protection. As Jennifer Hyndman comments, 'only marginal differences of time and space may distinguish an IDP from a refugee. … Borders breed politics and uneven geographies of power and status.'[16]

There is already a large literature on the definition of refugee, which I will not replicate here.[17] Defining refugee status has led to much dispute between various national governments, international agencies and NGOs. The standard definition is found in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. The convention defines a refugee as '[Any person who]…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.'[18] That definition, written in the context of the post-World War II European refugees, has been broadened by regional organizations, such as the African Union (formerly the Organization for African Unity). The African Union definition includes groups of people who are fleeing war or persecution.[19] Most refugees from civil wars fall under the broadened definition in which each individual does not have to prove persecution by the government. Would-be refugees are also victims of conflict-induced displacement. This includes groups that have not received refugee status (such as rejected Vietnamese asylum-seekers in Hong Kong), groups who have had their refugee status revoked (for example, Namibian exiles after Namibia achieved independence) or asylum-seekers pending resolutions of their cases.[20]

Internal displacement is a more recent category, although not necessarily a more recent phenomenon.[21] Internally displaced populations do not share the same international legal protection as refugees, in theory because they are still under the protection of their home state. In reality, the type of violence that causes their displacement – often government persecution – makes them even more vulnerable than refugees.

The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has produced a staggering number of displaced people. At the height of the conflict, there were three million IDPs and nearly half a million refugees. The refugees mostly congregated in camps across the border in western Tanzania. Those camps offered food, medical care, and protection from the combatants. In contrast, the IDPs in Congo lived in practically sub-human conditions. International aid organizations barely penetrated the conflict zones due to insecurity and a lack of infrastructure. The displacement in the DRC demonstrates the stark differences between achieving refugee status and remaining internally displaced.

Political Legitimacy

Political legitimacy determines which displaced groups have a chance at receiving international protection. If a displaced person crosses an international border and is recognized as refugee, he or she can claim legal protection from the host state or an international organization such as UNHCR. This protection can include permanent asylum and eventual citizenship for the refugee. In recent years, however, more states have used temporary protection measures that enable the state to send the refugees back home.

For an internally displaced person, political legitimacy is achieved, if at all, through more informal channels. Basically, IDPs depend on an external state or

organization championing their cause and ensuring that public attention focuses on their plight. In Darfur, victims of conflict-induced displacement suffered alone until human rights groups and governments exposed the abuses there and increased pressure on the Sudanese government. This is obviously a more tenuous sort of protection than that afforded to refugees. The international attention to Darfur's internally displaced people is unusual in a civil war. The international attention paid to Darfur's internally displaced is unusual in a civil war. Far more common is the indifference that has characterized the international response to the IDPs Congo.

Demographic Characteristics

Statistics on displaced groups often attempt to categorize a variety of data, including age, gender, and ethnicity. A bias of these statistics is that they usually focus on refugees in internationally-assisted settlements rather than displaced people who are 'self-settled', for example, living anonymously in local villages. As Hyndman warns, 'the ways in which difference is used, managed, and theorized both fuel conflict and potentially open up other less violent and hierarchical spaces'.[23]

Despite the biases, data about demographic characteristics are useful for answering many practical and theoretical questions. For example, some sociological theories hypothesize that high proportions of young men in displaced populations can lead to political violence and criminality. Data on age and gender, correlated with statistics on security, can either reinforce or dispel that hypothesis. Preliminary demographic data from refugee camps in Chad actually suggest a different hypothesis. Aid workers have noted with alarm that the men seem to vanish from the camps, most likely as recruits for various rebel forces. Thus, the camps have higher proportions of women, children, and the elderly than the non-displaced population.[24]

Theories of ethnic conflict hypothesize that violence is more likely if the displaced group is of a different ethnicity than the host group. Or conversely, ethnic kinship between the two groups can encourage them to join forces against a common oppressor. During the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo, many observers predicted that the thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees in Macedonia could lead to civil war by upsetting the delicate balance between Slavs and Albanians. The difficulty in creating typologies based on demographic distinctions, as I discuss further below, is the paucity of accurate data.

Humanitarian Status

Another distinction among groups is the amount and type of humanitarian aid that they receive. Political legitimacy affects the level of aid. Governments who want to downplay the displacement crisis, may prevent aid groups from reaching the displaced people. Self-settled groups tend to receive less than refugees in camps, mostly because it is easier logistically for aid organizations to work in camps. The level of media attention also determines assistance. A high level of attention

generally increases funding for a crisis and also encourages powerful governments to take action, even if that action is only a humanitarian response.

The differences in levels of humanitarian assistance can affect the other characteristics of the crisis. Some observers argue that generous assistance will prolong the crisis and make the displaced groups overly dependent on foreign charity. Others argue that a high level of aid will blunt the tendency for criminality and political violence that might otherwise occur in an overcrowded, unsanitary refugee camp. These opposing views can be tested with sufficient data.

These various categories can also, in many instances, apply to forced migrants who were not necessarily displaced by conflict. Development-induced displacement, for example, may produce assisted and unassisted displaced persons. Groups can move among these categories as their situation changes.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Ideally, researchers could follow the model set forth by Weiner in 'Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods' and collect data for all the various categories of conflict-induced displacement. One of the main impediments to doing so is a dearth of reliable data. Obtaining numbers of refugees is difficult enough, much less the data for reasons why they fled, types of violence occurring in their home state, and the detailed characteristics of the displacement crisis. For example, recent UNHCR figures present data by sex for 10.9 out of over 20 million persons of concern and data by age for only 5.6 million persons.[25] Data is even less reliable for internally displaced persons. Also, as Weiner noted, refugee data report stocks rather than flows, limiting analysis to snapshots of refugee groups over time. Weiner's conclusion is that 'all aggregate statistics on refugee flows should thus be interpreted with care'.[26]

The political tensions surrounding refugee enumeration are well known.[27] In fact, nearly every actor involved in a refugee crisis has some incentive to distort the refugee numbers. Perhaps as a way to avoid some of the political tensions involved, classification systems usually relate to technical or humanitarian (socioeconomic) factors. There is a need for more systematic understanding of the political forces involved in conflict-induced displacement. Efforts to disaggregate the character-istics of conflict-induced displacement must therefore either take into account the many biases and gaps in available data or develop better sources of information.

New technology is also assisting data collection on conflict-induced displacement. William Wood has demonstrated how geographic information systems (GIS) can be used to improve responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.[28] As Wood explains: 'GIS is a means to spatially organize a variety of data for any given place or area. The premise is simply that natural features (a mountain or a stream) and events (an earthquake or flood), as well as human activities, tend to occur on the earth's surface and can thus be linked by their relative location.'[29] NATO and UN missions in Kosovo used GIS to track landmines and damage to villages as part of the repatriation plan for

Kosovar refugees. There are infinite ways to use GIS, depending on the quality of data available and the questions that one wants answered.

Much of the further research that is needed could be accomplished by better using existing information. This could involve applying research from the fields of conflict studies and international relations to understand the characteristics of conflict-induced displacement. There is a great deal known about conflict and about displacement, but those stores of knowledge do not often inform each other. Integrating the many typologies of conflict and displacement, and creating new ones, can help overcome the gaps in the current understanding of conflict-induced displacement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For their helpful comments, I thank Karl DeRouen, Idean Salehyan, Carola Weil, the participants in the 2004 National Academy of Sciences workshop on 'Typologies of Relevance to the Study of Forced Migration', and the anonymous reviewer.

NOTES

1. David Turton, *Refugees, Forced Resettlers and "Other Forced Migrants": Towards a Unitary Study of Forced Migration* (Geneva: UNHCR, Sept. 2003), 10.
2. Raymond Thibodeaux, 'Chad Struggles with Growing Stream of Refugees', *Boston Globe*, 10 Aug. 2004; Raymond Bonner, 'Fleeing War, Refugees Met New Strife', *New York Times*, 4 April 2004; Christopher Marquis, 'Florida Senators Urge Action on Haiti, Fearing Tide of Refugees', *New York Times*, 19 Feb. 2004.
3. United Nations, '1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees', Article 1.
4. Reuters, 'Fear, Terror Still Stalk Sudan's Darfur – Annan', *New York Times*, 29 Dec. 2005.
5. Peter D. Bell, 'Darfur Desperate for Peacekeepers', *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 8 Dec. 2005.
6. Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2002) Chapter 5; and Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2005) Chapter 4.
7. Myron Weiner, 'Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows', *International Security* 21/1 (Summer 1996) pp.5–42, quote p.6.
8. Will H. Moore and Stephen M. Shellman, 'Refugee or Internally Displaced Person? To Where Should One Flee?' *Comparative Political Studies* 39/5 (June 2006) pp.599–622; and Will H. Moore and Stephen M. Shellman, 'Fear of Persecution: Forced Migration, 1952–1995', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40/5 (Oct. 2004) pp. 723–45. See also, Susanne Schmeidl, 'Exploring the Causes of Forced Migration: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1971–1990', *Social Science Quarterly* 78/2 (1997) pp.284–308.
9. See, for example, Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.) *Ending Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2003); Elisabeth Jean Wood, 'Civil Wars: What We Don't Know', *Global Governance* 9/2 (April–June 2003) pp.247–60; Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder, *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia UP 1999); Steven R. David, 'Internal War: Causes and Cures', *World Politics* 49 (July 1997); Michael E. Brown (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs 1996); Chaim Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Civil War', *International Security* 2014 (Autumn 1996) pp.149–71.
10. Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'The Logic of Violence in Civil War', (manuscript, New York University, March 2000, 1–2).
11. John Mueller, 'The Banality Of "Ethnic War"', *International Security* 25/1 (Summer 2000) p.47.
12. Nicholas Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: OUP 2000) p.61.
13. IRIN, 'Sudan-Chad: Chadians Look for Refuge in Volatile Darfur', IRIN News, 29 June 2006. Found at <www.irinnews.org >.

14. Michael McCarthy, 'US Military Plans to Lead Relief Efforts in Iraq', *The Lancet*, 361, 9358 (22 Feb. 2003) p.629.
15. Frederick M. Burkle Jr., Bradley A. Woodruff, and Eric K. Noji, 'Lessons and Controversies: Planning and Executing Immediate Relief in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq', *Third World Quarterly* 26/4–5 (2005) pp.803–4.
16. Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press 2000) pp.5, 27.
17. For a discussion of the definition of refugee, see Hyndman, *Managing Displacement* (note 16) pp.6–14; Zolberg et al., *Escape From Violence*, Chapter 1, 'Who Is a Refugee?', pp.3–33; and Susanne Schmeidl, 'From Root Cause Assessment to Preventive Diplomacy: Possibilities and Limitations of the Early Warning of Forced Migration' (PhD diss., Ohio State Univ. 1995) Ch. 2.
18. United Nations, '1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees', Article 1.
19. The OAU convention also distinguishes between 'a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion from outside'. OAU, *Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*, 1969.
20. For more on the exclusion and cessation clauses that deny or revoke refugee status, see the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 'Note on the Exclusion Clauses', and 'Note on the Cessation Clauses', 30 May 1997.
21. See the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement. Found at <www.brook.edu/index/taxonomy.htm?taxonomy = Politics,%20Global*Humanitarian%20issues%20and%20human%20rights*Internally%20displaced%20persons >.
22. Lydia Polgreen, 'Violence Forces U.N. To Evacuate Darfur Camp', *New York Times*, 8 May 2006.
23. Hyndman, *Managing Displacement* (note 16) p.61.
24. Gabriela Matthews, 'Chad Blog: Darfur's Men Vanish from Refugee Camp', Reuters AlertNet, 14 April 2006. Found at: <www.alertnet.org>.
25. UNHCR, 2003 *Global Refugee Trends*, Tables 1 and 10. Found at <www.unhcr.ch>.
26. Weiner, 'Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows', 17.
27. Jeff Crisp, 'Who Has Counted the Refugees? UNHCR and the Politics of Numbers', *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Working Paper No. 12 (Geneva: UNHCR June 1999).
28. William B. Wood, 'Complex Emergency Response Planning and Coordination: Potential GIS Applications', *Geopolitics* 5/1 (Summer 2000) pp. 19–36.
29. Ibid, p.24.