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Through the Developmentalist's Looking Glass: Conflict-Induced Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement in Colombia¹

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In this article, conflict-induced displacement (CID) and 'involuntary resettlement' are explored through the prism of Cernea's (1997) 'impoverishment risk and livelihood reconstruction' model (IRLR) a framework originally conceived to assess development-induced displacement (DID) and resettlement. The paper tests the viability and utility of Cernea's IRLR model in the context of CID in Colombia. Seeking to demonstrate key theoretical distinctions between CID and DID, the author calls for a flexible, co-ordinated and protection-oriented approach to resettlement in situations of conflict. Drawn from surveys of over thirty state and non-governmental entities addressing resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) and a programmatic review of the 'resettlement' experiences in two resettled communities, the article seeks to refine Cernea's IRLR methodology for CID situations. From the research process it emerges that the IRLR model serves two purposes in the analysis of CID: as a planning tool to document the capacities of social actors; and as a framework for the analysis of key impoverishment risks facing victims of war.

Introduction

Large-scale forced displacement presents one of the greatest challenges to humanity in the twenty-first century. It distorts regional, national and local economies and tears apart communities and families. Four causal agents catalyse massive forced displacement: natural disasters (e.g. drought); persecution (e.g. ethnic or religious); development programmes (e.g. dams and urban renewal projects); and violent conflict. The article focuses exclusively on the consequences of displacement and capacities for resettlement in the context of the latter category. It introduces a revised version of Cernea's (1997) 'impoverishment risk and livelihood reconstruction' (IRLR) model in order to identify a number of the central challenges associated with conflict-induced displacement (CID) and involuntary resettlement. Originally designed for assessing impoverishment risks and reconstruction in situations involving development-induced displacement (DID) and resettlement, the IRLR model is tested in the context of CID and resettlement. The output, then, is theoretically

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relevant as it represents the first application to CID of techniques developed in Cernea's model. One of the central advantages of the model over previous methods of resettlement analysis is that it moves beyond a narrowly interpreted linear perspective toward a less temporally-restrictive (time-bound) approach. As the IRLR model is neither spatially nor geographically confined, operating within both urban and rural contexts, it provides an extremely useful *departure point* from which to explore CID.

In seeking to test the viability of the IRLR model in cases of CID and involuntary resettlement, the article must first address three general questions: (1) what are the defining characteristics of CID; (2) how is involuntary resettlement in conflict different from resettlement attributed to development projects; and (3) what are the key advantages of the IRLR model over other forms of resettlement analysis? Divided into three sections, the article responds to these queries, first revisiting competing theories underpinning the study of internal displacement, the consequences of CID and its impact on vulnerable groups. It focuses on Colombia's displacement crisis in order to highlight the particular features of CID. The second section draws a comparative analysis between developmentalist interpretations of resettlement and the particular requirements of resettlement in conflict. It briefly reviews and expands the IRLR model, employing the framework as a conceptual template for the methodology in the remainder of the study. The final section draws from field research conducted in Colombia, illustrating the additional constraints hindering resettlement in situations of CID from a state, NGO and IDP perspective. In an effort to disaggregate IDP vulnerabilities, perceptions of risk and capacities for resettlement, the research methodology involved a combination of participatory and key-informant approaches. The article demonstrates that while the IRLR model can be applied to those situations involving CID and resettlement, it requires adjustment in the context of conflict and serves best as a macro-planning tool.

Conflict-Induced Displacement: A Review of the Concepts

Forced displacement, in which civilians, as opposed to armed actors, are the primary targets, has become a defining feature of the privatized intra-state conflicts or complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) of the post-Cold War era (Klugman 1999; Nafziger, Stewart and Vayrynen 1999a, 1999b; Kaldor 1998; Duffield 1994). It almost goes without saying that the forced displacement of civilians by armed combatants is a clear violation of international humanitarian law. But whether a consequence of either conflict or development, forced displacement is interpreted by international law as a fundamental violation of human rights. It is possible that, at first glance, forced displacement may not be interpreted as a human rights issue, but rather attributable to the secondary, if regrettable, effects of development or urban renewal, or a consequence of an armed conflict. Nevertheless, the threat or fact

of displacement from one's home or land is clearly one of the major injustices that can be committed against a person, family, household or community.

Even now, there is still no commonly agreed or binding definition of *who* constitutes an internally displaced person (IDP). Recent attempts to link the concept of IDPs to refugees theoretically and legally have only served to complicate the issue (Rutinwa 1999; Vincent 1999). Critics of the 'international refugee regime' insist that 'the IDP [debate] has contributed . . . a considerably more minor contribution than that which was originally anticipated by IDP advocates at the beginning of the 1990s' (Barutciski 1999: 4). Formally adopted by the UN in 1998, the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, while not obligatory, reflect existing norms of international law and seek to define the rights of displaced persons before, during and after CID. But one of the frequent criticisms of international legal standards for IDPs, is that singling them out would result, if unintentionally, in discrimination against others equally in need—leading to inequitable distribution of entitlements and intra-communal conflict. It is increasingly agreed that the particular needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs must be acknowledged in a way that does not create a new category of persons with special rights and privileges (Cohen and Cuénod 1995). Rather, it is important to ensure that in any given situation their unique needs are addressed (DIAL 1999; UNHCR 1998; USCR 1993).

Broadening the IAIHR (1993) interpretation of forced displacement, the UN's (1995) current working definition holds as internally displaced those

persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or *natural* or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country.

Some development agencies (e.g. the International Organization for Migration (IOM)) have proposed expanding the definition to encompass those who migrate as a result of poverty or other economic causes, though proponents of the humanitarian field argue that this limits the utility of the term. Indeed, if a focused response to CID is to be realized there is a need to qualify the term so that it covers cases involving explicit violations of human rights and not necessarily all victims of natural disaster. The *Guiding Principles* provide a preliminary framework for resolving this dilemma.

The dynamics of CID vary from spontaneous and nocturnal to premeditated and permanent. Accordingly, the duration of the 'displacement' itself varies, and is often subject to dispute. On the one hand, it is possible to establish the moment at which forced displacement begins because it is physically tangible, though the best time to apply lasting solutions or to return varies (DIAL 1999). Conventional wisdom would have it that the voluntary (or involuntary) return of IDPs to their homes or their reintegration elsewhere marks the end of internal displacement. But if there is inadequate cultural, physical and socio-economic security in regions of return, can internal displacement be perceived

as having ended? Surely, as noted by Partridge (1989) in the case of DID and by Cohen and Deng (1998a) with regards to CID, the mere act of relocation does not necessarily end internal displacement. Indeed, the all-too-common phenomenon of multiple (coercive) displacement makes an explicit or pre-defined time-limit extremely difficult to calculate. When, then, can CID be said to have ended? Determining when internal displacement ends should go beyond merely documenting where and whether return or relocation has occurred. A significant number of NGOs argue that arbitrary cut-off points put the lives of IDPs in jeopardy. Nevertheless, from a policy-making perspective, a cut-off point is crucial. One way of moving towards establishing appropriate criteria could be through the elaboration of a set of indicators determining whether the return or resettlement exercise is viable, whether reinsertion is effective and whether basic protection and security are assured at the area of reception. Indicators would have to capture a range of variables: from the psychosocial to the socio-economic. Similarly, indicators should be predicated on the extent to which local capabilities for achieving sustainable resettlement exist among the forcibly displaced. Cernea's IRLR model, detailed later in this paper, provides a preliminary framework for the analysis of such indicators.

The consequences of displacement and subsequent declines in individual and household entitlements during both DID and CID are severe (Cernea 1999; Cohen and Deng 1998b; Van Hear 1994). Some observers have also documented the immediate positive gains of CID, such as increased political participation, the emergence of and capacities for local organization and the changing status of women (Sorenson 1998; Byrne and Baden 1995). It should be noted that, particularly in the case of CID, such 'gains' are frequently short-term, palliative and often at the expense of horrendous loss. These include losses in both productive capabilities and access to basic services. Specifically, local production systems are dismantled, kinship groups and established residential institutions disorganized. Trade networks are shattered and re-configured resulting in the disruption of labour markets. In addition to the distortion of producer-consumer relations, informal social norms—mutual child-care, food security, revenue transfer systems, short-term credit, labour exchanges—are dissolved. The welfare losses, although not manifested in monetary terms, are often more significant than losses attributed to productive or economic dis-articulation (Los Andes 1999). Livelihoods are affected in painful ways: formal employment and personal assets are lost and health levels and access to public services deteriorate (Cernea 1997). The arrival of IDPs in an unfamiliar ecological or cultural environment is associated with high risks and uncertainty, due to difficulties in finding alternative income sources, land and housing. Traditional community and authority systems lose their leaders; symbolic markers are abandoned, dissolving the social mortar binding people to their cultural identity. Households have often been forced to confront these realities by temporarily sacrificing education, nutrition and medical attention to their children. After their initial displacement, as a result of household losses

of income, many children are stigmatized and drafted into urban/rural labour markets earlier than they (or their families) ordinarily would have chosen.

Conflict-Induced Displacement and IDPs in Colombia

Depending on who is consulted there are currently between 400,000 and 1.5 million displaced by CID in Colombia, or between 2 and 5 per cent of the global total (CONPES 3057, 1999; CODHES 1999a). The municipalities of expulsion have increased from 99 (1985–1994) to 114 in 1998 while the regions of reception have virtually doubled from 134 in 1994 to 266 in 1998. Disputes over the ‘actual’ number of IDPs continue to cause tension between state entities and the non-governmental community. This is due, in part, to traditional biases associated with the motives of IDP migration, increases in collective (as opposed to individual) CID, disparate approaches to data collection and the dilemmas associated with ‘case identification’.²

Population displacements in Colombia have traditionally been conceived as a product of a number of factors, with a particular emphasis on economic incentives. Observers of the displacement phenomena have generally taken on a functional equilibrium perspective. In the late sixties, virtually all forms of migration in the region, like population growth, were narrowly interpreted as ‘the result of purposeful behaviour—as people migrate because they have reason to believe that, by migrating, they can improve their condition and that of their family’ (Schultz 1969). The rational utility-maximizing model suggested that large-scale population displacements were actually pre-meditated shifts intended to adjust imbalances between regional supply and demand for labour. In spite of the high levels of violence experienced from the 1950s through to the mid-1990s, authoritative statist (read: élitist and militarist) observers have made only passing reference to the inter-regional variations in the levels of violence as potential contributors to individual decisions to migrate (Urrutia 1999).

It is today generally acknowledged by most international and domestic actors that the enforced displacement of the civilian population is a deliberate war strategy employed by the armed forces, guerrillas and self-defence (e.g. paramilitary) groups.³ Productive and politically active members of communities are targeted by all sides with a view to eliminating potential threats and dismantling production systems. Upon forcible eviction, land with strategic economic or military value is repopulated with supporters of either the guerrilla or paramilitary forces, thus creating individuated security zones (Pearce 1990). The guerrillas also provoke CID among perceived hostile groups and/or those who have infringed the rules of conduct imposed in the areas under their control. The forced displacement of the population does not simply reflect political or military objectives. A clear convergence may be observed between the strategy of the insurgents and the interests of certain economic sectors (both legal and illegal) that support paramilitary groups with an aim of increasing their stranglehold over natural endowments and productive land

(Pearce 1990). The conflict in Colombia, while differentiated among regions, is a veritable 'guerra de territorio' or war for land.

A complicating feature of CID in Colombia is that regions of expulsion are also regions of reception as IDPs seek to remain within a known area. Even so, instances of spontaneous voluntary return to regions of origin are rare. Individual incentives to return are further hindered as a significant proportion of IDPs come from the poorest regions of the country. Approximately 85 per cent of those forcibly displaced to urban regions are *campesinos* or rural smallholders, and less than 35 per cent of IDPs receive humanitarian support following CID. An additional problematic dimension of the conflict is that ethnic minorities (Afro-Colombian and indigenous) living in rural areas experiencing declining security have been targeted for CID in spite of declaring 'active' neutrality or establishing 'peace communities' (Brookings *et al.* 1999).⁴ Alarming, new trends are emerging: recent studies document the strategic depopulation of civilians from wealthy farming and mining areas over the past three years (GAD 1998a).

The consequences of CID for IDPs' access to legitimate education and health services are profound. Few, if any, provisions exist for continuing education for displaced people. As over 70 per cent of IDPs are under the age of 19, the long-term consequences of missed educational opportunities for forcibly displaced children are disastrous. Stigmatization and limited entry to formal labour markets are but two examples. What is more, over 80 per cent of IDPs interviewed by CODHES (1999a) have not had access to any form of health care since their initial displacement. Those who have received medical assistance complain of its extreme inadequacy. Another group particularly vulnerable to the effects of CID are the *indigenous* communities. Numbering approximately 720,000 in 536 'reserves' (Government of Colombia (GoC) 1999a), CID puts their very cultural and social existence in jeopardy. Attacks on *women and children* should also be highlighted; though many acts against women, particularly of a sexual nature, are left unreported (PCS 1998). Indeed, more than 58 per cent of the displaced are female, and of these 24 per cent are widows with dependent children.

Nevertheless, in spite of the dire statistics cited above, there is convincing evidence that forcibly displaced people should not be conceived as static victims. Rather, they often make significant contributions to the 'reconstruction of livelihoods and communities, building on existing experience and networks, but also experimenting with new ways and means' (Sorensen 1998: 76; Lautze and Hammock 1996). In the absence of strong state commitment toward displaced people, 'self-help' or 'solidarity' groups are prevalent throughout the country (GAD 1998b). As alluded to above, IDPs are frequently among the most active and productive contributors to their communities prior to CID—many having skills that can be productively harnessed in the resettlement process. In the case of DID, resettlement potentially releases 'productive energies and creative talents bottled up by traditional exploitation, paternalism' and monopolies on human and

resource-based capital that are often characteristic of rural societies (Partridge 1989: 352). Interviews with ICRC, for example, suggest a strong interest in the identification and re-establishment of coping mechanisms among IDP communities throughout Colombia.

Resettlement in Development and Conflict

During the 1970s and early 1980s, with the exception of some early pioneers (e.g. Colson 1971), the development discourse gave relatively little analytic attention to the causality of forced displacement and resettlement. National and international concerns with the social and economic consequences of involuntary resettlement have broadened in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century by the growing (and internationalized) political resistance emerging from key actors in this process—the populations of the forcibly displaced. The proliferation and intensification of CHEs, emergence of the *Guiding Principles* and the convergence between humanitarian and developmental spheres have contributed to increased attention to the plight of IDPs (Klugman 1999; Holtzman 1999).

But confusion prevails with regard to the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary displacement and resettlement. Indeed, as a starting point, it is useful to note that almost all migratory movements involve an element of choice—‘people frequently have the latitude to decide where to go and, indeed, whether to flee at all’ (UNHCR 1997: 35). Forced displacement, however, is distinct from voluntary population movements. Voluntary or economic migration, including rural–urban (and intra-urban) movements, is more a reflection of people’s deliberate pursuit of new opportunities. Indeed, displacement and resettlement become involuntary when the choice to remain is not provided; in this situation, in both rural and urban contexts, the forcibly displaced are facing more risks than opportunities. Conceptually, these two processes (forced displacement and involuntary resettlement) are part of a single continuum; though in practice, the first does not always bring about the second. Specifically, involuntary resettlement attributed to DID differs in important ways from involuntary resettlement attributed to famines or CID. Involuntary resettlement attributed to DID can be prepared (e.g. assessments and contingency plans) well in advance. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank (1999) have evolved principles to ensure the return of the displaced to their previous standard of living. But resettlement planners, particularly in a conflict or post-conflict situation, rarely anticipate the displaced population’s return to their previous standard of living. In Cernea and Guggenheim’s view:

the resettlement caused by development projects is the direct outcome of a planned political decision to take land away from its current users ... most people believe that famine and war should be avoided, while the projects that cause resettlement fit neatly into national ideologies about development (1994: 15).

Whilst projects involving DID can be said to fulfil a lofty nationalist goal and profits can be used toward realizing a more equitable resettlement effort, CID constitutes a direct violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. In the case of DID, the stakeholders and beneficiaries of resettlement are more explicitly identifiable and the burden of repayment for resettlement, at least in theory, is clear. With regards to CID, identification of beneficiaries and questions of *de facto* responsibility and financing are not so readily apparent. Political will for sustainable resettlement is frequently absent, given macro-economic instability resulting from conflict and the potential involvement of the state in precipitating CID.

In light of the rapid rates of urbanization evidenced throughout Latin America (exceeding 70 per cent in Colombia) and the significant rural–urban movements of IDPs, it is useful to draw some distinctions between urban and rural involuntary resettlement. In the context of DID, urban resettlement generally refers to the forcible intra-urban relocation of households as a result of urban renewal or modernization projects. Rural DID and involuntary resettlement is often conceived as a consequence of large-scale infrastructural projects such as hydro-electric dams and agro-industrial programmes. In the case of CID, urban and rural resettlement intersect—with vast movements of individuals and groups from their rural communities to peri-urban regions and shanty towns. Repeated inter-village and inter-urban displacement is not uncommon during the ‘resettlement’ process. Moreover, the return and resettlement objectives of municipal authorities in the urban context are generally predicated on the rapid relocation of IDPs to rural zones (‘transitional resettlement colonies’)—areas often experiencing high levels of conflict. Alarming, experiences with resettlement and reintegration in urban regions of Colombia suggest that the exercise is often problematized by IDPs who frequently bring elements of the conflict with them to their new, relatively stable, communities.

Cernea (1997, 1999) argues that socially responsible resettlement is economically justified because the costs of poorly managed programmes extend well beyond the immediately affected population—to the regional economy and the host population in relocated areas. In situations involving DID, poorly executed resettlement often induces local resistance, increases political antagonisms, entails extensive project delays and postpones project benefits for all concerned. The benefits lost because of avoidable project delays occasionally far exceed the marginal cost of a comprehensive resettlement package. In the case of CID, while these obstacles are magnified, their interrelationships are more complex. Not only are the regions of return and relocation likely to be areas of marked inequality, but critical issues of land availability (of adequate quality and with guarantees of ‘protection’) and government financing are both uncertain. Effective preparation is often further hampered as public data collection facilities and land-registration systems are frequently directly or indirectly targeted and destroyed. Worryingly, the physical security of public and non-governmental ‘implementers’ has been

called into question (UNHCR 1999a). What is more, humanitarian assistance is rarely sustained *during* the entire resettlement process: a factor rarely adequately considered in the design of relocation programmes. Inclusive planning and preparation prior to resettlement is similarly problematized by the erratic and unpredictable nature of CID. Ultimately, in regions of severe conflict, the coercive return and forced resettlement of IDPs without sufficient protection, humanitarian assistance or foresight into socio-economic integration is a powder-keg, often putting in jeopardy 'the entire reconciliation and reintegration process in a country' (Cohen and Cuénod 1995:12). This would suggest that the benefits of introducing a sound resettlement initiative are perhaps even more lucrative in the case of CID. The marginal returns in terms of reinforcing state legitimacy potentially outweigh the costs.

Methodology of the Risk and Reconstruction (IRLR) Model

In the past, virtually all forms of resettlement were viewed through a neo-classical lens, with otherwise traumatic social costs treated as the unavoidable price of economic development. The absence of appropriate safety-net programmes and resulting impoverishment of resettlers led to a general re-think of past approaches. With the decline of (albeit still prolific) narrowly conceived cost-benefit appraisals, resettlement has increasingly been conceived as a sequential, if dynamic, process involving planned phases: from planning, transition and economic and social development to a handing-over period (Scudder and Colson 1985). Originally designed to reflect 'voluntary resettlement', early theoretical approaches were later extended to 'involuntary resettlement'—in spite of the substantial distinguishing characteristics between the two processes. Voluntary settlements, for example, rarely produced the 'transitional resettlement colonies' that were (and still remain largely) unavoidable in many projects dealing with involuntarily-displaced. Scudder and Colson's approach, while formative, is of particularly limited value in contexts of severe conflict and widespread insecurity—wherein a smooth and synchronized transition is problematized by (real and perceived) violence. Indeed, mounting evidence suggests that, even in cases involving DID, 'not all projects pass through all stages . . . a steady movement [through the four stages] is the exception rather than the rule' (Cernea 1997: 1573). Rather, the displacement-resettlement continuum, if such a thing exists, is a complex process of negotiation—a process invariably subject to highly politicized interventions.

In an effort to better grasp the complicated processes of forced displacement and involuntary resettlement in both DID and CID scenarios, the article engages the IRLR model: a conceptual template for macro-policy and planning purposes. Whilst originally designed for the analysis of DID and resettlement, 'it is possible to extend this model, with appropriate adjustments, to the analysis of . . . other displaced populations such as refugees deprived of their habitat and assets not by development but by civil war, ethnic persecution, or

natural disasters' (Cernea 1997: 1571). The model reveals to policy makers, the attendant risks and possible outcomes of forced displacement, providing a rigorous and flexible framework for assessing the socio-economic consequences of large-scale population movements. It should be noted, however, that the approach necessarily captures only the general processes—and therefore requires local contextualization.

The model is premised on eight basic regularities (that tend to occur in situations of involuntary resettlement), whose convergent effect is the rapid onset of impoverishment: *landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, economic marginalization, increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common property* and *social disintegration*. Crucially, it has never been tested in situations involving CID. As the model was initially designed exclusively for the assessment of DID, a series of supplementary variables drawn from the author's research have been added: *loss of education, loss of political participation* and *violence*. Their importance is illustrated in the frequency with which they were prioritized by international and indigenous actors interviewed in Colombia. Cernea's model, as distinct from Scudder and Colson's approach, is not aligned to a rigid time-frame or staged sequences. Neither is it spatially bound—it is open to planning and implementation in both urban and rural contexts. A key requirement of the model, and of equitable resettlement more generally, is the identification of key social actors participating in the process and their perceptions of risk. A deficit of Cernea's approach, however, is its failure to highlight both the vulnerabilities and capabilities of those displaced—concentrating instead on their collective risks of impoverishment. Other critics similarly argue that Cernea's model is overly general—inflexible to the complex realities of IDPs (see for example Horgan 1999). In this study, an attempt was made to overcome this particular weakness through an analysis of IDP vulnerabilities and capabilities in two resettled communities. Nevertheless, one of the central objectives in applying the model to the Colombian context is to demonstrate empirically that the features claimed by the model are present in situations of conflict and to better equip policy formulation to mitigate the risks facing relocated IDPs. The eleven components of the reconstruction process—*land-based re-establishment, re-employment, housing reconstruction, social integration, improved health care, adequate nutrition, restoration of community assets, community reconstruction, access to educational opportunities, reformation of political activity* and *protection*—constitute policy interventions designed to reverse the eleven impoverishment risks.

The evolution of an IRLR profile in the study of CID in Colombia is a product of extensive interviews with a sample of representatives from among over 30 urban and field-based agencies addressing, in one way or another, IDP assistance and involuntary resettlement. The following sections seek to identify key social actors, document their capacities along the IRLR schematic and highlight their response to CID. Several (abbreviated) tables have been included, identifying a sample of organizations and their central themes.

Though resettlement priorities are clearly regionally differentiated and variable by political, social and organizational culture and region, there are some broad similarities among the different actors. Among public entities, the eleven reconstruction variables, where addressed, have been traditionally approached in a piecemeal fashion: each actor addressed involuntary resettlement along isolated (sector-specific) criteria. Increasingly, the public sector response is being consolidated and coordinated through a single agency. In an effort to define a common strategy to the issue, international and national NGOs have also sought to strengthen their coordination through coalition building and integrating their response. While time and resource constraints limited the assessment to a sample of agencies from each sphere, it was possible to distil a number of instructive trends.

The State of Resettlement: Government of Colombia

According to the GoC, displacement is either deliberately chosen (economically motivated) or forced (a result of disaster or violence). Government-sanctioned resettlement, as currently interpreted by CONPES 3057 (1999), is synonymous with 'dynamic relocation'—either a supportive response to spontaneous movement or purposefully designed. Very generally then, the GoC's policy response to CID is either 'voluntary return' of IDPs to their place of origin or, in cases where this is not feasible, the 'resettlement' of conflict-induced IDPs to new regions (RSS 1999a). In an effort to create the incentives for return and resettlement, the GoC hopes on the one hand to encourage development, political incentives and public order in regions of return and on the other, to identify and support *alternative productive projects* for IDPs. There is special emphasis, within the newly-elected Pastrana government's 'National Plan for Peace and Development' (Plan Colombia 1997), on rural resettlement. It is widely, if not cynically, acknowledged that the options for sustainable and secure 'return' during conflict are remote.

The idea of 'resettlement' (as a consequence of CID), both conceptually and as policy instrument, is virtually without precedent in the GoC. Until recently, the approach was centralized, and very much resembled the linear or schematic framework advocated by Scudder and Colson (1985). But backed by constitutional reform (1991), Law 387 (1997) and Executive Decrees,⁵ the recent CONPES 3057 (1999) document represents a shift in conventional top-down and centralized approaches to resettlement: seeking to actively coordinate actors towards a decentralized and multi-sectoral response. This is supposed to be directly linked to the devolution of authority to local governments who are currently responsible for the provision of services in education, health, water, sanitation, roads and agricultural extension to residents (Fiszbein 1997). Under Law 387 (Articles 16–18), they are also obliged to respond to CID, return and resettlement through the creation of local representative displacement councils. In those cases where return is

viewed as impossible, or IDPs have resettled themselves in urban zones, the state's Social Solidarity Network (RSS) has outlined a 'flexible' subsidy scheme, to be administered by municipal councils and the RSS and funded out of the National Investment Fund for Displacement and the Investment Fund for Peace (CONPES 3057 1999). Basic sanitation and certain public services not covered by the municipal councils are to be assured by responsible Ministries. CONPES 3057 (1999) reads like a development worker's dream. The new approach represents an important and progressive conceptual shift from static interpretations of 'relocation', from one fixed point to another, to 'relocated livelihoods'. It also integrates, to a limited extent, Cernea's vision of a non-linear or non-spatial response to CID and involuntary resettlement. In this sense, resettlement initiatives would complement ongoing sectoral activities, focusing on the (identified) human and social capital among IDPs themselves while filling in gaps where capacities were seen to be weak or non-existent.

Under the auspices of an *information system*, the RSS anticipates improving global estimations, land registration and elaborating an early warning system (coordinated by the Ombudsman's Office). In an effort to ensure physical *prevention* of CID, the RSS seeks to integrate the information system with improved local response capacities, with the support of the Ministry of Defence, the Ombudsman (Defensoria) and NGO partners. In addition, to mitigate CID from regions of poverty (i.e. regions marked by high indices of expulsion and reception), Plan Colombia (1997) will target socio-economic support to promote socio-economic development. (NGOs interviewed noted the problems of this strategy, in that regions with 'development activities' are often those most susceptible to attack.) In this sense, CID is still partially interpreted by the GoC as a consequence of poverty (i.e. economic disincentives) rather than explicit violations of human rights. The *humanitarian response* of the RSS is divided into three temporal phases and involves coordination between a range of public entities, from the Department of Health (through the Family Welfare Institute (ICBF)) to the Ministry of Education. Finally, *return, resettlement* and *stabilization* are predicated on the establishment of public order and the cultural and economic integration of displaced populations into social life. It anticipates increased access to land, the creation of incentives for voluntary return and resettlement and sustained protection. Throughout, the process is guided by a Technical Unit (UTC), composed of representatives from UNHCR and RSS. On their own, Law 387 (1997) and CONPES 3057 (1999) lack a comprehensive operational framework for the prevention of CID or a truly integrated approach to involuntary resettlement. They are criticized for lacking continuity with previous Agrarian Reform Agency (INCORA), Agrarian Bank (Caja Agraria) and Urban Housing Department (INURBE) agreements and only marginally consider sanctions and punitive measures for the protagonists of the conflict. Critically, consideration of enforcement remains largely absent. Table 1 indicates the division of responsibilities along the reconstruction variables in the IRLR

model. Areas that are marked dark grey indicate gaps, and light areas illustrate potential weaknesses, in state capacity.

Nevertheless, the GoC's response toward IDPs is paradoxical. It has sought to strengthen existing (albeit ambiguous) institutional mechanisms to better accommodate the perceived needs of the displaced, without taking into consideration their acute vulnerabilities. For example, with regard to employment and food security, INCORA provides two credit mechanisms for smallholders (including IDPs) choosing to produce alternative crops but there are no (legal) agricultural products that are sufficiently financially viable to pay back the interest and the credit. What is more, the introduction of 'productive projects' has been viewed as an error 'on a massive scale', partly because IDPs are unable to pay back INCORA credit in the months preceding harvest. INCORA also operates a system of subsidies for the purchase of land whereby 'the poor' (again, including resettled IDPs) are 'enabled' to purchase land at 30 per cent of the total cost (Law 160 1994). The land acquisition system is highly controversial.⁶ From a free-market point of view, the state is faced with two unappealing options: (1) it can purchase inexpensive, isolated and poor quality land, of limited productivity and in conflict-prone regions, or (2) it can acquire more productive and highly priced land that IDPs are unable to afford. In reality, INCORA, due to financial constraints, has been forced to take the first option. Where resettlement activities have taken place, there is often evidence of insufficient and inconsistent funding (unfulfilled promises), land speculation and opportunistic behaviour among bureaucrats, and limited assistance or protection throughout the reintegration period. A similar problem relates to INURBE, which also provides a nominal housing loan for low income (urban) households—on the condition that the recipient provides matching funds. Evidence suggests, however, that IDPs rarely possess sufficient capital to match the loan, nor are there any private commercial banks in a position to provide conditional loans or credit.

In the end, the proposed system depends largely on political will and effective institutional machinery at the municipal (implementing) level. The reality on the ground suggests, however, that civil servants are not particularly well-informed with respect to their obligations under Law 387 (1997), CONPES proposals or the particular requirements of IDPs.⁷ Certainly, from a rational choice perspective, there exist few incentives to convince either locally or regionally elected authorities to respond to conflict-induced IDPs from other departments. The implicit expectation of CONPES planners, however, was that local level action for IDPs could be encouraged through incentives targeted at municipal authorities. But this is unlikely to occur in practice. In spite of the much lauded decentralization and reform process initiated via constitutional reform, official transfers and dispensation mechanisms from the Investment Fund for Displacement to local authorities have not been adequately prepared. What is more, the estimated requirements set out in the displacement fund (Decree 501, 1998) appear to be severely undervalued, suggesting a looming problem for long-term resettlement

Table 1

Division of Responsibilities for IDPs (Research in Bogota May–August 1999)

	Information System	Prevention	Humanitarian Assistance ¹	Return/Resettlement and Stabilization
Land-based re-establishment	RSS ² : registration	Plan Colombia: socio-economic development in economically marginalized areas to mitigate CID	GoC *	RSS /MAD ³ : identification of land titles INCORA ⁴ : subsidization of land purchase by 70%
Re-employment and income generation		Plan Colombia: preventative (as above)	ICBF ⁵ : childcare ***/****	Plan Colombia RSS: productive projects (pilot)
Housing reconstruction	RSS: registration	Plan Colombia: preventative (as above)	GoC short-term refuge */**	RSS: return packages INURBE ⁶ / MAD: urban/rural housing
Social integration			GoC: collective aid for ethnic minorities Min. Health */**/****	
Improved health care		Plan Colombia: Preventative (as above)	Min. Health/Social security: hygiene *** ICBF: trauma */**, women's health **/****, and primary health care **/****	
Nutrition			GoC: nutrition and water */**/****	ICBF (nutrition) Mayor's Office (utility)
Reconstruction of community assets				

continued

Table 1 continued

Community reconstruction		RSS: Document capacities in expulsion/reception areas	ICBF: strengthening women's groups and the participation of youth in planning ***	RSS: capacity building with local organizations and alliances with private sector
Access to education		Plan Colombia: preventative (as above)	ICBF: children's schooling **/**** Min. Education: ***	
Reformation of political associations		Plan Colombia/ Min. Justice: strengthening judicial system in affected areas		
Protection	Defensoria: emergency preparedness Presidential Observer/ Min. Interior/General Prosecutor/ Min. Defence: registration RSS/Min. Public Affairs: registration centre	Min. Defence: strengthening local response RC: training on human rights Min. Interior: national/international observer teams Territorial Entities/ Mayors/ Governors/IDP Councils: preventative	UTC: capacity building for community response and formalizing municipal action plans	Army: preventative RSS/Defensoria: registration RSS/Min. Interior/ CHR: some financial coverage for displacement support Police: elite human rights monitors
Evaluation	DNP ⁹ : SINERGIA consultants RSS: internal UTC: monitoring GoC/IDP Observer: general	RSS: internal UTC: monitoring GoC/IDP Observer: general	RSS: internal UTC: monitoring GoC/IDP Observer: general External Auditors: general	RSS: internal UTC: monitoring GoC/IDP Observer: general

1. The GoC divides humanitarian assistance into three phases: * Urgent: first 72 hours following displacement, ** Emergency: humanitarian assistance during crisis period, *** Transition: temporary settlement prior to return or relocation. 2. Social Solidarity Network 3. Ministry of Agriculture and Development. 4. Colombian Agrarian Reform Office. 5. Colombian Family Welfare Office. 6. National Institute for Urban Reform. 7. Government Technical Unit. 8. Counsellor for Human Rights. 9. Department of National Planning.

planning. As noted by Mejia (1999: 183), 'underestimation of costs and the resulting unavailability of resources have often led to . . . providing lots rather than finished houses.'⁸

NGOs: Searching to Fill the Gaps

As no single international agency has been assigned absolute responsibility or has sufficient capacity to attend to the varied requirements of CID and involuntary resettlement, the commonly agreed strategy involves a combination. The most frequently engaged inter-agency approach is the 'Lead Agency model', wherein a single organization is responsible for coordinating the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts of which IDPs are a part (UNHCR 1999a). In Colombia, however, there is no comprehensive inter-agency approach—rather it is characterized by a complete lack of communication and coordination among and between public entities and NGOs. In theory, the national capacity of the state (e.g. RSS) to respond is high, while local capabilities are relatively weak. As a result, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs have emerged to fill the gap. In regions that are particularly affected by conflict, non-state actors have become intermediaries between the state and civil society, in some cases taking on comparable status to political parties. But as a result of their rapid increase in number and frequently narrow perspective, their activities have often resulted in contradictory impacts—leading to confusion between public entities and NGOs.

As illustrated in other surveys assessing co-ordination during CHEs (Kumar 1997; Cohen and Cuénod 1995), most agencies interviewed in Colombia recommended that impartial UN bodies or humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR or ICRC take the lead role in responding to both CID and involuntary resettlement. They advocate that agency responsibilities should be determined along their 'comparative advantage' and exercised within a coordinated framework. An emerging development among international agency directors, state actors and local organizations, however, is the increasing (albeit reserved) support for the vital role of state agencies, particularly RSS. Partnerships between public and private (for profit and non-profit) actors are also slowly materializing, based on the successful resettlement initiatives following the Quindío earthquake and return exercises in North and Eastern Colombia (Muggah 2000). Even so, all agencies, with the exception of the ICRC, revealed a certain measure of peripheralization from the state. Most agencies interviewed supported or implemented a network approach—encouraging, where possible, 'local capacities' and support for community-based organizations (CBOs). It is generally accepted by all actors interviewed that local networks and community-based solidarity groups achieve the greatest impact for the least investment. It is similarly recognized that the state has little capacity to directly reproduce this phenomenon due to structural and financial constraints.


At an organizational level there is a collective call for increased co-ordination between NGOs, public entities and involuntarily resettled (and host) communities in the planning, design, implementation and financing of return and resettlement programmes. Evidence of uncoordinated approaches is rife throughout Colombia, though particularly manifest in regions of high conflict. Where relations between government and NGOs have been poor, lack of coordination has led to parallel rather than complementary NGO service provision. A majority of those interviewed argued that overlapping delivery could be reduced through the articulation of clear lines of command and measures to increase accountability between NGOs and the state. In addition, NGOs must (sensitively) pressure municipalities and public entities into complying with their agreements and legal obligations to displaced people. At the same time, however, the research process revealed paternalistic attitudes towards IDPs among a number of local solidarity and rights groups, with representatives often speaking of 'my communities' and 'our IDP representatives'. Such sentiments often lead to IDPs' (in many cases justified) reluctance to collaborate with state actors on account of the perceived risks presented to their existing institutional and social investments.

Table 2 is a representative sample of NGO agencies working with IDPs at both the national and local levels. It combines the 11 reconstruction variables with the schematic approach advocated by CONPES 3057 (1999). Of the 11 reconstruction variables in the revised IRLR model, protection from violence and guarantees of sustained security were ranked as the first priority in 90 per cent of the interviews with non-governmental actors. Protection was interpreted as moving beyond traditional politico-military approaches towards a more holistic human-security oriented model. The improvement of civil-military relations and instruction in intra-community conflict management were perceived as important areas in ensuring protection throughout resettlement programmes. Efforts to support re-employment, land-based re-establishment, reformation of political participation, and social integration, were all viewed by NGOs as integral components of sustainable resettlement. Restoration of community assets, improved health and food security, while vital, did not figure as prominently in respondent priorities. These gaps are manifest in public and non-governmental programmes for CID and resettlement (note the dark and light grey areas in tables 1 and 2). Virtually every representative recognized the need to consider the heterogeneity of IDP groups in the design of resettlement alternatives. They have therefore acknowledged the need to move beyond narrow targeting of the forcibly displaced to more geographically-based and inclusive programmes.

The following section provides a brief history of involuntary resettlement programmes in the Departments of Tolima ('La Miel') and Cordoba ('Las Dudas'). The case studies focus on the variegated costs of CID (e.g. transaction costs, family losses, losses of expenditures and productive assets) and the corresponding compensatory mechanisms (e.g. support from public and NGO actors, household earnings and self-help) employed by IDPs. The rank-ordering

Table 2

A Sample of Non-State Capacities (Research in Bogota, May–August 1999)

	Information System	Prevention	Humanitarian Assistance	Return/Resettlement and Stabilization
Land-based re-establishment	UNHCR: registration IOM: Registration UNCHR: testimony CODHES: data GAD: workshops	CCJ: attention IOM: attention UNHCR: attention	Caritas Española: short-term support/refuge	ANDE: micro-credit
Re-employment	UNHCR: attention CODHES: data		Caritas Española Short-term productive projects ICRC/RC: alternative productive projects WFP/UNDP: food-for-work and QIPs	ANDE/Mencoides/FEDES: alternative income-generation initiatives MPDL/PCS/WFP/Oxfam/ANDE enterprise development, productive projects UNDP: employment (PRO-DEP) IOM: support for alternative crops
Housing reconstruction	IOM: registration CCJ: attention CODHES: data		DIAKONIA: housing improvements Oxfam: building materials and construction of homes	MPDL: housing improvements Oxfam/International community: selective assistance
Social integration	CODHES: data CINEP: data	CINEP: collaborative	Church: Pastoral committees and community workshops	ANDE: collaborative Mencoides/FEDES: rebuilding with Church support UNICEF: programmes with children

continued

Table 2 continued

Improved health care	CODHES: data	MSF: preventative ICRC: preventative SCF: sexual health	ICRC/RC: training, assistance MSF: curative UNICEF: psychosocial	ACH: hygiene and surveys Church, DIAGONIA , IOM , UNICEF: psychosocial ICRC/RC : (temporary) IOM : psychosocial workshops MPDL : health programmes MSF : health (immediate needs and surveys) SCF : support of locality
Improved health care	CODHES: data	MSF: preventative ICRC: preventative SCF: sexual health	ICRC/RC: training, assistance MSF: curative UNICEF: psychosocial	ACH: hygiene and surveys Church, DIAGONIA , IOM , UNICEF: psychosocial ICRC/RC : (temporary) IOM : psychosocial workshops MPDL : health programmes MSF : health (immediate needs and surveys) SCF : support of locality
Nutrition	UNHCR: attention CODHES: data	ICRC: food security OXFAM: food security WFP: food security	ACH: hygiene/ supplementation Church: food assistance ICRC/RC/WFP : food aid OXfam: distribution WFP: distribution	ACH: recuperation (temporary) Mencoides PCS/DIAL/Oxfam ICRC : (temporary)
Reconstruction of community assets	CODHES: data			Mencoides/ANDE

continued

Table 2 continued

Community reconstruction	CINEP: data CODHES: data	CINEP: social work	Church: Pastoral committees and support for peace communities Oxfam: cooperative projects WFP: gender sensitization	Church: capacity-building
Access to education	CODHES: data	CINEP: rights based CCJ: rights based SCF: quality	Church: Informal/Formal education and training programmes ACH: gender-specific (women)	ANDE: informal or vocational training DIAGONIA: clothing for children SCF: community support and training MPDL/ANDE: support and building
Reformation of political associations	CCJ: attention CODHES: data	CCJ: attention	DIAGONIA: democratic participation. Justiz y Paz: support for peace communities PCS: capacity building	DIAGONIA: democratic participation/human rights workshops DM/FEDES/Mencolides SCF: children/youth workshops
Protection	CINEP: advocacy CCJ: advocacy IOM: early warning UNHCR: registration	ICRC/RC: presence Int'l Agencies (ABC/DIAL/PCS/Oxfam/UN) presence MSF: presence WFP: prevention UNHCR: presence	ICRC/RC: presence International Community: presence Peace Brigades/Justiz y Paz: Presence UNHCR: capacity building for municipal police	Asociacion Navarra Nuevo Church/DIAL/OCHA: verification FEDES: presence International Diplomatic Community: presence
Evaluation	UNHCR (UTC): evaluation CODHES	CODHES	UNHCR (UTC): determining capacities in receiving/expulsion areas	DIAL: quarterly reports

For an explanation of the acronyms, see Appendix.

of community perceptions of risk (IRLR model) among demographic samples from each community demonstrate the severe consequences of CID. In this way, perceptual gaps are revealed among state, NGO and IDP actors.

CID and Resettlement in La Miel

Located in the Department of Tolima, some 20 km from the capital, Ibagué, 'La Miel' ('Honey') is popularly conceived by the GoC as a 'successful' resettlement initiative. It consists of a culturally homogeneous group of eighty households from the Department of César who were displaced by paramilitaries in early 1996. The majority of respondents claimed to have moved between three and five times before finally occupying INCORA offices in Bogotá for eight months in an expression of political protest. After repeated demonstrations, INCORA purchased a 610 hectare plot for an exorbitantly high price (1.4 billion pesos, or US\$ 1.2 million at 1996 rate of exchange) to be discounted to the community by 70 per cent. As distinct from other resettled communities, the residents of La Miel refused to purchase the land and are therefore living 'illegally' on the site.

The state's planning and preparation for their arrival was negligible: transportation and plastic sheeting were all that was provided. Its response following their arrival was minimal: basic 20m² houses and electricity leads were provided by the (erstwhile) office of the Presidential Counsellor for Displacement. RSS consulted community leaders on house design while INCORA conducted induction seminars on agrarian reform (Law 160, 1994), credit opportunities and the importance of alternative productive projects. The NGO community's response was perceived by the community to be more substantial, with the Belgian Embassy, Oxfam-Belgium and the Red Cross (RC) contributing substantial food and housing assistance over a period of between three and eight months (see table 3). Participatory mapping exercises revealed that the state did not explicitly take into account issues of seasonality (time for planting and harvest) in the early stages of the resettlement experience. From the rapid rural appraisal (RRA) exercises, it became clear that their relocation in the month of December (1996) was ill-suited to the crop cycle, reducing the community's capacity to grow subsistence crops upon arrival.

The inadequate provision of seeds and tools at the early stages of the resettlement further hampered IDP reintegration. Interviews with the IDP community's directorate revealed that the municipal authorities had been relatively pro-active in the early planning stages of physical reconstruction—promising the erection of a water tower; 'health promoters' (one contracted from among the IDPs) and four locally-contracted teachers for the school. At the time of the author's visit, however, the water tower was two years from completion, the contracts for the health promoters had expired and the teachers were in the second month of a strike, in protest at poor wages.

Table 3 consists of a costing exercise conducted with four randomly selected families with between five and eight members (M). It does not account for either the welfare losses or collective forms of ownership among residents of La Miel, though these were captured to some extent in the IRLR risk assessment detailed below. Indeed, this is a notable omission as campesinos generally do not retain liquid monetary assets, rather investing income in productive assets (e.g. machines and livestock). Common-pool resources figure prominently in investment patterns—as collective ownership frequently offsets individual losses. Nevertheless, the cumulative deficits (converted intentionally into monetary units) paint a powerful economic picture of household coping strategies in the face of CID.

The perceived risks drawn from the IRLR exercise also confirmed the results emerging from the mapping and costing exercises. Predictably, loss of land was perceived as the greatest risk across all sections of the community. Counter-intuitively, the risk of violence, both external and internal, was overwhelmingly seen as presenting the lowest risk. Domestic violence is virtually non-existent in La Miel, though it has been known to occur. Men ranked their key risks as follows: loss of land, increasing mortality and morbidity, loss of education, loss of community services and common property and violence. Women, while also viewing loss of land (ownership) as their first priority, regarded loss of education, loss of housing, loss of community services and common property and loss of political participation as their central concerns. Youth representatives also perceived loss of land as their highest risk, considering loss of work, food insecurity, loss of education and loss of housing as their secondary priorities. The experience of CID and involuntary resettlement in Tolima are remarkably similar to those of the residents of 'Las Dudas' in Cordoba.

CID and Resettlement in Las Dudas

The capital of Cordoba, Monteria, is an epicentre for IDPs, home to Cantacarlo, Latin America's largest constellation of involuntarily resettled *desplazados*.⁹ The city itself, numbering 320,000, suffers from an extremely poor absorption rate as its income, education and health indicators are among the lowest in Colombia (DNP 1998). Moreover, 'subterranean or poverty-induced displacement' is rarely captured in formal statistics, as the convergence between poverty and CID is particularly acute in rural resettled communities outside the departmental capital. Approximately 150 km from Cordoba, the residents of 'Las Dudas' ('Hardship') were former inhabitants of four departments before being forcibly displaced by armed actors from all sides of the conflict. For between two and four years following CID, they waited for INCORA to secure appropriate land outside Monteria. As negotiations stalled, IDP households accumulated debts in the departmental capital. As distinct from the IDPs in La Miel, the new inhabitants of Las Dudas purchased their land from INCORA. First arriving in April 1998, they were granted

Table 3

Costs of Displacement and Resettlement: La Miel (in millions (m) of pesos)

	Family 1 (5M)	Family 2 (7M)	Family 3 (5M)	Family 4 (8M)
Losses from displacement (1996)	Food Prd ¹ : 3 m Livestock: 0.6 m Land/Fencing: 3.95 m Housing: 0.6 m Possessions: 1 m	Food Prd: 0.5 m Livestock: 6.9 m Fencing: 3.25 m Housing: 1.3 m Funds: 0.2 m	Food Prd: 1.8 m Livestock: 1.97 m Land/Fencing: 2.4 m Housing: 0.5 m Misc: 0.08 m	Food Prd: 5.1 m Livestock: 1.85 m Land/Fencing: collective Housing: 3.1 m Possessions: 1 m
Debts from displacement	Trans ² : 0.195 m Subsistence ³ : 1 m (Interest 7%)	Trans: 2 m. Subsistence: 0.4 m (10%)	Trans: 1.6 m. + Debt of 4 m (at 10%)	Trans: 0.8 m Subsistence: 2 m
State support for displacement/resettlement	RSS: Articles of clothing for schooling and some health support	INCORA: consultations on credit and land purchasing options	None	RSS: Health support
Non-state support for displacement/resettlement	RC: Assistance 0.75 m Oxfam: Food, Funds for Housing	RC: 3 months food Oxfam: Food/Housing support, 6 months food	None	RC: Assistance 1 m Oxfam: Food/Housing support
Income (1999)	Food Prd: 1.5 m Collective: 0.4 m	Food Prd: 2.3 m Subsistence: Yucca	Food Prd: 2 m Collective: 0.6 m	Food Prd: 2.2 m Subsistence: Fruit
Expenditure (1999)	Food Cons ⁴ : 2 m Schooling: 0.15 m Health: 0.5 m	Food Cons: 1.9 m Schooling: 0.65 m Health: 0.15 m	Food Cons: 1.5 m Schooling: 0.4 m Health: 0.175 m	Food Cons: 2.4 m Schooling: 0.64 m Health: 0.1 m
Debts to state	5.1 m for land (unpaid)	5.1 m for land (unpaid)	5.1 m for land (unpaid)	5.1 m for land (unpaid)
Total accumulated losses/debts	5.3 m (not including land)	9.2 m (not including land)	8.4 m (not including land)	7.8 m (not including land)
Total earnings (as of 1999)	-0.75 m	-0.2 m	+0.525 m	-0.94 m
Total deficit (as of 1999)	6.1 m	9.4 m	7.8 m	8.7 m

Interviews in La Miel: 28 July-1 August 1999

US\$1 = 1950 pesos

¹ Food production (Food Prd.) consists of the results of a comprehensive 'food economy' mapping exercise, involving the estimated cumulative value of all harvested and recently planted crops (marketed, staple and subsistence) prior to displacement (Interviews, 1999).

² Transportation (Trans.) includes the costs for all forms of transport from the origin point to the final resettlement community. It is an aggregate figure encompassing the costs of multiple displacement (Ibid.).

³ Subsistence includes the total costs of food and health services during the period of displacement—lasting between 1 and 3 years in some cases (Ibid.).

⁴ Food consumption (Food Cons.) involves an estimated cost of expenditure on food during 1999. It takes daily or weekly expenditure and estimates an average annual intake.

provisional assistance (i.e. tents, basic materials for a temporary 25 m² shelter and a week's worth of food) from the former Presidential Council for Displacement and the RSS. Household sizes varied from five to 14 members (M), with 112 families settling in the northern sector (Upper Duda) and 13 female-headed households residing in the south (El Tomate).¹⁰

With literally nothing prepared in advance of their arrival, collective memories are of severe hunger and deprivation. Nevertheless, several relatively well-organized CBOs emerged from among the IDPs themselves. Resettlement plans were prepared by the communities with the support of NGOs based in Monteria (e.g. Maria de Cano, Accion Contra el Hambre (ACH), Promusil). Working proposals for productive projects were sent to the Ministry of Agriculture and the RSS, but they have not yet received a tangible response. In the first year of their resettlement, wet weather severely limited their harvests. Productive projects introduced by the RSS did not adequately consider the humidity of the soils and maize crops failed. At present, in spite of repeated promises of support from the public authorities, there is no access to electricity, functioning latrines, potable water, health services, formal educational opportunities or communications infrastructure. Approximately four hours from the capital, the roads, both from Monteria and within the community, are impassable after even nominal rainfall.

Table 4 illustrates the aggregate costs and losses attributed to CID and involuntary resettlement drawn from a sample of families. The residents of both Upper Duda and Tomate were significantly wealthier than the inhabitants of La Miel prior to CID, but are clearly more impoverished following their resettlement. Many recently arrived residents of Las Dudas were unable to purchase land and have resorted to living three to four families in homes designed for one household. While the data presented in the table does not sufficiently capture the intricacies of the respondents' life histories, it generates a compelling picture of their losses attributed to CID.

From the IRLR exercise, violence was ranked as the lowest risk among all groups—men, women and adolescents alike. Just as the two settlements in Las Dudas demonstrate differing levels of political organization, two different profiles evolved from surveys. From among the adult male inhabitants in Upper Duda, loss of education, food insecurity, and loss of home and work were noted as presenting the highest risks. Women perceived losses in common property and community services, loss of home and losses in education and work opportunities as their priorities. Adolescents considered losses in common property and community services, limited access to education, losses in work opportunities and declines in health as presenting the highest risk factors. Among the adult male respondents in Tomate, declines in health, problems with housing and the absence of political participation were ranked as their highest priorities. The women representatives responded in a similar fashion, envisioning declines in health, losses in educational opportunities, inadequacy of housing and losses in common property and community services as the key risks. Finally, adolescents were most concerned with losses in

Table 4

Costs of Displacement and Resettlement: Las Dudas (in millions (m) of pesos)

	Family 1 (7M)	Family 2 (6M)	Family 3 (8M)	Family 4 (7M)
Losses from displacement (1996)	Food Prd: 1.9 m Livestock: 4.8 m Land: 6 m Housing: 2 m Possessions: 1 m Savings: none	Food Prd: 7.5 m Livestock: 0.9 m Land: 2.1 m Housing: 1 m Possessions: 1 m Savings: none	Food Prd: 2.5 m Livestock: 8 m Land: 2.5 m Housing: 4 m Coral: 4 m Savings: 6 m Store: 5 m	Food Prd: 2 m Livestock: 4 m Land: 20 m Housing: 1 m Fencing: 6 m Coral: 3 m Savings: none
Debts from displacement	Trans: 0.145 m Rent/food: 3.5 m Income: 3.6 m. Debts: none	Trans: 0.2 m Debts: 1.5 m Rent/food: 1.2 m (family) Edu: 0.4 m Health: 1 m Income: 3.6 m	Trans: 0.3 m Debts: 7 m Rent/food: 1.8 m (family) Edu: 0.8 m Health: 2 m Income: 2.6 m	Trans: 0.15 m Debts: none Rent/food: 5.7 m Edu: 1 m Health: 0.5 m Income: 1.2 m
State support for displacement/resettlement	RSS: food assis. (x 2) ICBF: 1 visit Consejeria: temp. housing	Consejeria: temp. housing	RSS: food assis. (x 2) ICBF: 1 visit Consejeria: temp. housing	RSS: food assis. (x 2) ICBF: 1 visit Consejeria: temp. housing
Non-state support for displacement/resettlement	RS: food assis. (x 2) ICRC: food assis. (1) MSF: medical (x 2) ACH: survey (1) Marie de Cano: capacity building PROMUSIL: cap.	None	RS: food assis. (x 2) ICRC: food assis. (1) MSF: medical (x 2) ACH: survey (1) Marie de Cano: cap. PROMUSIL: cap Mencoldes: food (1)	RS: food assis. (x 2) ICRC: food assis. (1) MSF: medical (x 2) ACH: survey (1) Marie de Cano: capacity building
Income (1999)	Food Prd: subs. Collective: 0.36 m	Food Prd: subs. Collective: 1.36 m	Food Prd: subs. Collective: 0.36 m	Food Prd: subs. Subsistence: 0.36 m
Expenditure (1999)	Food Cons: 1.2 m. Schooling/Health: can't afford	Food Con: 0.8 m Schooling: 0.015 m Health: can't afford	Food Cons: 1.8 m Schooling: 0.015 m Health: can't afford	Food Cons: 1.3 m Schooling: 0.01 m Health: can't afford
Debts to state	7.1 m (interest at 40% over 20 years) and 0.4 m (interest on productive project at 36%)	7.1 m (interest at 40% over 20 years) and 0.4 m (interest on productive project at 36%)	7.1 m (interest at 40% over 20 years) and 0.4 m (interest on productive project at 36%)	7.1 m (interest at 40% over 20 years) and 0.4 m (interest on productive project at 36%)

continued

Table 4 continued

Total accumulated losses/debts	23.4 m	20.7 m	48.7 m	48.6 m
Total earnings (as of 1999)	-0.84 m	-0.455 m	-1.5 m.	-0.951 m
Total deficit (as of 1999)	24.286 m	21.2 m	50.2 m	49.6 m

Interviews in Las Dudas: 17–20 August 1999

common property, losses in educational access and problems associated with housing.

Conclusions

As suggested at the beginning of the paper, there are strong similarities between DID and CID: both are deliberate and can represent explicit violations of human rights. Similarly, each can lead to impoverishment if equitable and carefully planned resettlement programmes are not considered. A central distinction between the two forms of displacement is predictability: CID tends to be immediate, while DID is a more protracted process. Involuntary resettlement during conflict tends to be, by its very nature, transitory while DID is more permanent. CID does not capture the electorate’s imagination in the same way as DID: particularly as there are few electoral gains to be made in allocating funds for the former. The fact that victims of CID are explicitly targeted, as opposed to being designated arbitrarily, also represents an important distinction. The need for ‘protection’ of conflict-induced IDPs during the entire resettlement process is a critical issue. Relatedly, due to the shifting nature (and, by definition, illegality) of conflict, definition and assignation of responsibility for the beneficiaries and stakeholders of CID and resettlement are not always clear. Ultimately, the CHEs that precipitate CID generally attract more international attention than incidents involving DID, though the competing and multi-sectoral NGO response does not necessarily ensure a positive environment for return and resettlement.

Methodologically, the planning of resettlement programmes for either DID or CID in Colombia is problematized by the *de facto* convergence of DID and CID. The causal agents (i.e. push factors) of forced displacement frequently intersect, with armed actors supporting or reacting against infrastructural or commercial interests. Nevertheless, the IRLR model provides a useful conceptual framework for the analysis of involuntary resettlement and the categorization of priorities according to central impoverishment risks. Key weaknesses with regard to the applicability of the model lie in its generalized nature or macro-political outlook and exclusive focus on risk avoidance. As emphasized in the preceding sections, conflict-induced IDPs, while vulnerable and increasingly susceptible to impoverishment, are frequently among the most

productive members of their respective communities, maintaining dynamic coping strategies to mitigate the attendant risks of CID and involuntary resettlement.

From the interviews and case studies, it is clear that virtually all the risk variables in the IRLR model feature prominently in CID and involuntary resettlement. This suggests, at a preliminary level, that the model is sufficiently flexible for application to the planning for either DID or CID. On the one hand, the IRLR model provides a useful framework both for organizing capacities of social actors (tables 1 and 2) as well as for categorizing risk of impoverishment among 'beneficiaries' (case study IRLR surveys). Perhaps another strength of the model relates to the way in which it raises more fundamental questions concerning co-ordination, gaps in capacities and the role of political will in responding to CID and involuntary resettlement. Where the model fails, however, is in its inability to address potentially destabilizing structural issues preceding the 'displacement event'. Instead, the IRLR framework casts the resettlement effort as a compensatory exercise. Similarly, the model focuses on 'impoverishment' risks of IDPs without identifying their potential and real capabilities for poverty avoidance. There is a need, then, to adapt the model to contextual realities and include space within the framework for the documentation of IDP capacities.

From the research process, it is clear that there exists a significant gap in state and INGO/NGO perceptions of resettlement needs and the requirements of IDPs. Though the Colombian state's normative framework represents an extremely progressive departure from its earlier stance, there is an apparent disconnect between procedure and implementation. Faced with declining budgets, requirements for investment recovery and increasing land and construction costs, the state tends to transfer part of the resettlement costs to IDPs. From a rights perspective, where populations are forcibly displaced, they should not have to bear any of the resettlement costs and must not be restricted to a single resettlement option. Additional financial burdens must not be placed on low-income CID households that are already at risk of impoverishment as a result of precarious incomes and labour instability. Equally alarming, as evidenced in La Miel and Las Dudas, scarce resources are not necessarily being directed in an appropriate or timely manner. There appears to be significant emphasis on addressing the short-term requirements of resettlement—protection, food security, emergency health and rapid income generation—at the expense of community services and common property resources or more fundamental issues of land re-establishment. These latter sectors are perceived to be critical priorities among each of the resettled communities interviewed.

Elements of decentralization of service-delivery functions and IDP representation are well outlined in public documents, but not realized in the field. The devolution of resources and capacities to the local level, through a genuine and transparent shift of funds to implementing agencies in affected municipalities, would encourage a process of decentralized delivery. Where

necessary, 'capacity-building' programmes must be targeted to both locally-occurring institutions and municipal authorities with a goal of better involving local actors and IDPs in the design and execution of resettlement decisions. At the same time, the process must avoid forced consensus, respecting the heterogeneity, seasonal priorities and variegated requirements of displaced people and resettled communities. Resettlement, then, must be conceived as the design of a sustainable planning and implementation process and not just as document preparation. From an operational perspective, there must be an increased effort toward strengthening land registration and assets prior to and following CID. This would contribute to the organization of voluntary return and appropriate compensatory systems for resettled individuals. The improved communication of IDP rights and incentives in receiving areas as well as the offering of a wider range of resettlement options would increase the rate of registration and implementation of resettlement schemes. The simultaneous adoption of realistic and collectively determined time-horizons, income restoration objectives and issues of seasonality in the planning process would reduce the instance of poorly-planned programmes.

The GoC must put greater emphasis on conceiving of resettlement as an 'opportunity for development'. Central indicators of success would be premised on a comparative evaluation of living standards prior to forced displacement and following relocation. Similarly, the focus of resettlement efforts should not be restricted solely to addressing IDP 'risks' but should rather include supporting their active networks of reciprocity, productive processes and coping strategies. In other words, an effort should be made to build on the dynamic response mechanisms and productive systems manifest among IDPs. Instead of treating IDPs as bound entities or a window for emergency assistance, planners must locate productive linkages with their wider community, informal trade networks and enterprising individuals. In this fashion, the state must conceive of IDPs as dynamic social agents rather than as a 'problem'.

1. The following article is an abbreviated version of a comparative institutional diagnostic elaborated with the National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion or DNP). The research for the article was conducted with the financial and institutional support of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS).

The author acknowledges that forced displacement in Colombia is largely a product of violence and that the political resolution of the country's Complex Humanitarian Emergency (CHE) would be the single most effective means of addressing its long-term development requirements. In the meantime, the author conceives of resettlement, where planned and implemented effectively, as a short-term instrument for protection and a viable long-term tool for sustainable development. He would like to thank Michael Cernea, Bill Partridge, Roger Zetter, Manuel Fernando Castro, Clara Leal and representatives at the DNP and Brookings Institute who provided helpful comments on the draft.

2. Case identification relates to the determination of IDP status and forms of displacement. Naturally, 'individual' displacement is distinct from 'collective' displacement. It is difficult to obtain an approximate figure for the number of 'individual' displacements since the majority of victims choose not to report or register their circumstances or resettlement for fear of reprisal. Predictably, it is easier to target programmes for 'collective' displacees.
3. According to data accumulated by CODHES (1999a, 1999b), UNHCR (1997) and the Bishops' Conference (Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia 1995), armed forces account for 16 per cent of IDP displacement. Guerrillas are responsible for between 25 and 28 per cent of the displacement, the paramilitaries for 33 per cent and general perceptions of fear and violence for an additional 16 per cent. It should be noted, however, that trends change from year to year.
4. Interviews with the chief of logistics for ICRC noted the systematic abuse of human rights of indigenous and Afro-Colombian peoples in 'Peace Communities' bordering the Rio Sucio in Uraba. This is in spite of the Afro-Colombian Law 70 (1993) granting minorities special attention.
5. The key pieces of legislation include Law 387 (1997) which defines a normative and institutional framework for the problem at all its stages; Decree 173 (1998) which adopts the Plan for Integrated Attention to Displaced Populations; Decree 501 (1998) which regulates the National Displacement Fund; Decree 489 (1999) which invests responsibility for IDPs in the RSS, and CONPES 3057 (1999) which concentrates authority and accountability in the RSS.
6. The country's troubled legacy of land reform stretches back to 1936 (e.g. Law 200) and its failure has been much to the benefit of large land owners and the commercial sector. In spite of repeated attempts to redistribute land and strengthen the property rights of Colombian citizens, there has been little substantive change in land ownership since the thirties (Osorio and Lozano 1999).
7. Interviews with municipal State officials in Bogotá, Cartagena, Ibagué, Montería. The problem is compounded by the clear linkages, among certain administrators and elected officials, with paramilitary interests.
8. The experience of the World Bank in Latin America, for example, suggests that resettlement programmes are frequently under-resourced and typically 10 to 24 months behind schedule (conversations with Cernea 1999).
9. There are an estimated 15,000 IDPs in Cantacalero and approximately 110,000 conflict-induced displaced in Córdoba.
10. The 13 female-headed households consist of a settlement of women whose husbands were killed in the conflict. Their community, as distinct from the larger group in the northern sector, enjoys a marginally higher level of solidarity and political organization. Nevertheless, the overall socio-economic and health status of each cluster remains the same.

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Appendix

List of Acronyms

ACH	Acción Contra el Hambre (Action Against Hunger)
ABC	Association of British NGOs in Colombia
ANDE	Asociación Nacional de Desplazados (National Association of IDPs)
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Development
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CCJ	Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (Colombian Commission of Jurists)
CHE	Complex Humanitarian Emergency
CID	Conflict Induced Displacement
CINEP	Centro de Investigaciones para la Investigación Popular
CODHES	Consultora para Derechos Humanos y Desplazamiento

CONPES	Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social
DIAL	Diálogo Interagencial de Colombia (Inter Agency Dialogue in Colombia)
DIAKONIA	Swiss Development Agency
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación (Department of National Planning)
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
FEDES	Fundación Educación y Desarrollo (Foundation for Education and Development)
GAD	Grupo de Apoyo a Desplazados (Support Group for Organizations of IDPs)
GoC	Government of Colombia
IADB	Inter American Development Bank
ICBF	Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (Colombian Family Welfare Office)
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
IAIHR	Inter American Institute for Human Rights
INCORA	Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria (Colombian Agrarian Reform Office)
INURBE	Instituto Nacional de Reforma Urbana (National Institute for Urban Reform)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRLR	Impoverishment Risks and Livelihood Reconstruction
MPDL	Misión de Paz y Desarrollo Libre (Mission for Peace and Free Development)
MSF	Médicos Sin Fronteras (Doctors without Borders)
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PCS	Project Counselling Service
PRODEP	Programa de Desarrollo Empresarial (Programme for Entrepreneurial Development)
PROMUSIL	Local Capacity Building Organization in Córdoba
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
RSS	Red de Solidaridad Social (Social Solidarity Network)
SCF	Save the Children Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UTC	Unidad Técnica Conjunta (Government Technical Unit)
USCR	United States Commission for Refugees