The absence of property rights leads to dissipation of resource rents
in fisheries. Economists have long recommended the assignment of property
rights to the fishery as a means to internalize the stock externalities that lead to
rent dissipation. However, there is less agreement and little research on the optimal
nature of property rights for fisheries. Sole ownership of the fishery, while
potentially efficient, is generally not politically acceptable. Individual transferable
quota (ITQ) systems may fail to achieve an efficient outcome for a variety
of reasons, many of which are related to spatial phenomena. Territorial user
rights in fisheries (TURFs), also will generally fail to achieve efficient outcomes.
This paper illustrates a number of cases where inefficiency may persist
in a rights-based fishery management system. Some of the potential benefits and
costs of territorial stock use rights in fisheries (T-SURFs) are discussed along
with the role of marine zoning.